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REPORT ON OPERATIONS

25X1A 2. [ ] reported that the only change to the launch schedule was a delay in the launch of Mission 1108 from 26 November to 4 December. The schedule is as follows:

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
CORONA

1108 - 4 Dec 69  
1109 - 18 Feb 70

25X1A COLOR FILM - MISSION 1108


3. [ ] reminded members there would be 800 feet of color film (SO-242) on Mission 1108 which should provide about one day of camera operations. All the color film will be added to one camera thus permitting simultaneous coverage in black and white. Chairman requested that the NRO provide a target accessibility list for the color portion of the mission to assist ICRS in identifying targets for coverage. He requested that this information be made available three or four days prior to the actual operation. Chairman noted that weather would be the biggest factor influencing where the film would be expended.

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proposed for use in South China in December. [ ] noted that while the drone is not an effective means of satisfying requirements in the area, however, it could best be used against the type of problem stated in the memorandum. He described in general terms the intelligence problems in South China as they relate to photo reconnaissance as being:

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- c) To obtain comprehensive coverage on a broad range of targets.

He states that, while the optimum means for collecting against these requirements was the U-2, there seemed to be little likelihood that a program for use of that system over China would be approved in the immediate future. He also noted that the current priority list did not encompass the intelligence problems outlined above and would be inadequate, therefore, as guidance for such a program, if proposed or authorized. He expressed the view that guidance for planning of manned or drone reconnaissance missions over China, including any related target lists, should be tailored to the problems of priority concern as well as the capabilities of the system(s) proposed or approved for use at particular points of time. Guidance given for planning of missions by one system was not automatically applicable or necessarily compatible for use by another system. The paper submitted by CIA was developed with these thoughts in mind and was intended to displace the existing priorities list (which he believed should be abolished). "The DIA member agreed that the existing priorities list must either be replaced or conscientiously worked on by the membership. He stated, however, that he did not believe in AD HOC formulation of requirements through compilation of membership memos for each prospective mission, and he hoped that a more systematic method of specifying objectives in priority order of need could be achieved."

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

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9. Due to the short time frame in which the information had to be forwarded to the operator, the Chairman requested that members review the CIA target list and provide comments/concurrence by noon, Thursday.

COLLECTION GUIDANCE FOR DRONE AND SR-71 MISSIONS

10. A discussion as to the procedures and proper channels for providing collection guidance for Drone and SR-71 missions was prompted by the CIA paper on South China which recommended that the targets be forwarded to the NRO. The CIA member noted that this was purposely included in an effort to clarify COMIREX responsibilities and participation in the drone and SR-71 mission planning process. The DIA member expressed surprise that such clarification was needed. He noted that the established COMIREX procedures for handling these type requirements was for ICRS to forward them direct to DIA for further transmittal to the JRC/JCS for appropriate collection action. There has been but one exception to this procedure during the past few years and that was for a test flight of a drone that had not as yet been certified operational. [redacted] noted that to date COMIREX has not had a very direct involvement in the actual planning of these missions and expressed the view that a process similar to that used for the satellites would be desirable. However, this may not be feasible due to the remoteness of the operators.

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
11. [redacted] in response to [redacted] comments, disagreed with the inference that the present interface procedures with the operator were inadequate. He stated that the two systems had been fully responsive to national requirements as formulated by the ICRS and that mission planning along with other related operational matters were being done by SAC with the highest degree of professional competence. He then went on to explain the procedures currently employed in planning the missions as follows:

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- a) Drones in South China -- Missions are planned against the South China priority list which is in response to a USIB requirement.
- b) SR-71 in North Korea -- Since there is not a comparable priority list for North Korea, missions are programmed against those COMIREX targets contained in the IROL that have been assigned a Priority 1 by the DoD. [redacted] stated that a recent check revealed there were 54 priority 1 targets. The targets by category are: 13 SAM sites, 1 Coastal Defense site, 16 Airfields, 9 Ports/Naval, 9 Ground Force Installations and 6 Complexes.

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12. The Chairman stated that he was aware of the political consideration involved in this matter, however, he would attempt to ascertain the proper channel from the ICRS to the operator.

#### NORTH KOREA

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13. [ ] reported that CIA would have a paper in the near future regarding mission guidance for the SR-71 in North Korea. This paper will not focus on a current intelligence problem, as was the case with South China, but will instead take an area approach. As an example, he noted that numerous military targets are spread across the country in an area about 30 miles removed from the DMZ and still 30 miles further back is another belt of targets. On the ground force side of these targets are units that are rotated to the front. He voiced the opinion that coverage of these areas could provide a better understanding of ground force order-of-battle and deployment. [ ] concluded by noting that he did not see an overriding need at this point in time for a mission, but if one was approved it was incumbent upon ICRS to participate in the planning stage. [ ] noted that the DoD intelligence needs for reconnaissance of North Korea were not the same as the CIA's. He further stated that the DoD justification would most likely be the deciding factor as to whether or not the missions would continue to be flown.

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#### TARGET UPDATES

14. The weekly transaction sheets (pages 705 - 717, dated 10 November and pages 718 - 731, dated 17 November) containing the following target actions were approved:

101 Additions  
118 Changes  
14 Deletions  
7 Reactivates  
1 Pending

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

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MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

15. ICRS Meetings During December - [redacted] reported that two meetings would be required for the remainder of the month. The meetings were scheduled for the following dates to complete action on the items indicated:

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16. MC&G - Chairman informed members he had sent a memorandum to the NRO reaffirming the ground rules for operating the KH-4 against MC&G requirements. The gist of the memorandum was that COMIREX had not established a minimum or maximum film allotment on a mission-to-mission basis, however, ICRS should be notified when the figure reaches five percent. A decision would be made at that time regarding additional expenditure. [redacted] noted that weather has been the controlling factor.

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



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Acting Chairman  
Imagery Collection Requirements  
Subcommittee

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
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26 November 1969

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
IMAGERY COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS SUBCOMMITTEE OF COMIREX

AGENDA

10:00 2 December 1969, Room 2G 22 Headquarters

1. Operational Report - NRO
2. South China/North Vietnam Priorities List  
(ICRS-D-6/18-7, 6 November 1969)
3. 
4. Discussion of North Korea Target Guidance to  
Mission Planning - Chairman
5. Update COMIREX Target File.  
(Pages 705 thru 747).
6. Other Business.

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